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PREFACE
The theory and practice of democracy may be viewed 
from many different perspectives: (1) as a means of achiev­
ing higher ends; (2) as a political method for the allocation 
of finite resources; (3) as a protective system to guard the 
people from one another; (4) as an authority structure in 
which everyone is to have a semblance of equal say; (5) as a 
way to alleviate and resolve power conflicts among competing 
factions; (6) as a way of representing the masses in complex 
political affairs; (7) as an aspect of the distinctive and 
often unique culture of a particular nation.
Whatever the perspective, democracy may be perceived, 
especially in the United States, as pertaining to public 
policy making, that is, political democracy. There is also 
the concept of industrial democracy which is, simply stated, 
political democracy applied to the workplace. Proponents of 
industrial democracy contend it may provide new impetus to a 
stagnating political democracy through the realization of the 
democratic goal of participating in decisions affecting one’s 
life, including worklife. It is my firm belief that indust­
rial democracy enhances the attainment of this goal through 
not only economic benefits, but that the participation 
experience gained from the work place greatly increases the
political socialization of the "industrial democrat."
The Federal Republic of Germany is a nation which 
has legislated a system of industrial democracy, and thereby 
provides an opportunity to examine the consequences of a 
post-industrial society attempting to securely establish 
political democracy. Pertinent reasons for studying indust­
rial democracy in West Germany are threefold: first, West
German labor-management relations have long been concerned 
with industrial democracy and both labor and management have 
adopted as their form of industrial democracy co-determina­
tion, the particular subject of this thesis. Second, I 
place a high premium on the actualization of industrial 
democracy in post industrial societies. And third, the 
nature and implications of industrial democracy have only 
recently come to the attention of political scientists.'*"
Several questions may be addressed in considering 
co-determination in West Germany and its implications for 
other economically advanced nations. How successfully have 
the West Germans transferred democracy to industry? Can the 
practices and attitudes necessary for industrial democracy 
be successful in light of the traditional authoritarianism of 
West German industry? In a general context and not limited
^"Edward S. Greenberg, "Industrial Self-Management and 
Political Attitudes," The American Political Science Review 
75 (March 1981): 29-43, cf. J. Maxwell Elden, "Political 
Efficacy at Work: The Connection Between More Autonomous
Forms of Workplace Organization and More Participatory Poli­
tics," The American Political Science Review 75 (March 1981): 
43-59.
to the Federal Republic, one could ask whether industrial 
democracy in any form is compatible with mass technological, 
bureaucratic society? How much democracy in industrial 
decision-making is possible without detrimental interference 
with the efficiency of production? What conditions best 
facilitate the practice of industrial democracy? What are 
the implications, not only in West Germany but elsewhere, of 
instituting industrial democracy? The list of questions may 
go on and on, ad infintum, but the particular questions 
addressed by this thesis are: what historical political in­
fluences and forces do and will condition the pattern of 
industrial democracy, in this case West German co-determina- 
tion, and which cultural factors have made co-determination 
into a system maintenance implement rather than a system 
change implement?
Unfortunately, due to my lack of German language 
skills, the research for the thesis has had to be limited to 
English language translations of primary sources and other 
available secondary sources. There is a plethorea of 
original German works and writings on co-determination which 
were inaccessible due to my limitations, but if possible 
should be considered and consulted.
Finally, I would like to express my sincere apprecia­
tion to Dr. Bruce Garver and Dr. Kent Kirwan for participat­
ing on my Thesis Committee and taking and active interest in 
its proceedings. Also I would like to thank Dr. Orville
i
iii
Menard for his scholarly advice and encouragement, without 
which I would surely never have finished this project.
1CHAPTER I
AN INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 
IN WEST GERMANY
Many people today identify worker participation in 
the industrial decision-making process with the sharing of 
power suggested by industrial democracy. A more restrained 
attitude is that industrial democracy is simply a method to 
provide employees with more information on the functioning 
of their company. Some content that participation inade­
quately defines the problem, that the proper and more 
important word is involvement. In fact there is a continual 
expansion of participation into new areas of politics, and 
the range of issues which it includes is constantly increas­
ing. Sometimes this expansion is the result of legislation, 
while other times it is the result of voluntary actions and 
agreements.
In the broadest sense of the term, worker participa­
tion covers three wide areas: (1) the way in which employees
influence, or are enmeshed in, the decision-making process of 
industrial enterprises; (2) job satisfaction and work organi­
zation, i.e., improving the quality of the job, making the 
job more interesting, and defining the social organization 
of work details? (3) financial participation, which can in­
clude profit sharing and employee stockholding, essentially a
2more equitable way of distributing capital.'*' These are dif­
fused areas of participation, and any specific example of 
participation will include more than one— such as work 
groups being responsible for organizing their own plan of 
operation within the general production guidelines of the 
plant. Indeed, no one particular form of participation is 
mutually exclusive, and in any situation the complete pattern 
of participation must be seen as a coherent whole.
This thesis contends that patterns of participation 
are not mutually exclusive and no one pattern will adapt it­
self to every case, for what is correct in one situation may 
be quite inappropriate in another. Participation within an 
organization has to be endogenous and molded to the particu­
lar set of circumstances that are prevalent at the moment.
The form of participation depends, among other things, on 
the type of industry, its history, particularly of industrial 
relations, the size of the concern, the level of expectation 
among the employees, and no less important, the political 
structure that sets the parameters for these operations. 
Worker participation in an iron works factory with 3,000 
employees will be markedly different from that in a large 
retail store. And neither pattern will bear any more than a 
cursory resemblance to what might be considered correct for 
a small bakery primarily employing women as part-time
. Wallace Bell, Industrial Participation (London: 
Pitman Publishing Ltd., 1979), pp. 220-221.
3employees. Even within a single company, the pattern of 
participation will often vary considerably from one section 
to another.
In examining worker participation, one needs to be 
clear about purposes. There are three basic and essential 
purposes: (1) to improve the quality of working life and
the satisfaction workers gain from work; (2) to improve the 
quality of production and enhance efficiency within enter­
prises; (3) to give workers greater experience in and know­
ledge of the affairs which affect their lives. These are 
complimentary purposes and may be considered equally impor­
tant. Experience gained from conditions at work promises to 
allow the potential of participation fully to develop. It is 
the potential of democratizing the workplace which gives in­
dustrial democracy its impetus and it is the experience with 
industrial democracy that will breathe new life into polit­
ical democracy.^
In the last three decades, many Western European 
nations, such as Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands, 
have independently followed the example set by West Germany 
in actively supporting industrial democracy through the use 
of various forms of co-determination. Co-determination has 
been introduced into the social and economic lives of the 
aforementioned nations through legislation and regulation.
2Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory 
(Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1970); and G.D.H. Cole, 
Self Government in Industry (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1918).
4A common theme to ail co-determination legislation in Western 
Europe is participation by labor representatives in the 
decision-making processes of industrial organizations. Co­
determination laws are usually accompanied by additional 
legal restrictions on the rights of management, restrictions 
that primarily resolve and clarify any problems of interpre­
tation and implementation that may be generated by the 
co-determination laws. The political significance of co­
determination arises from the resulting reallocation of 
authority, responsibility and, hence, power. An analysis of 
co-determination in the Federal Republic of Germany must then 
consider both the particular content of the various laws and
what effect these laws have upon the pecularities of West
. . . . . 3German political socialization.
The Federal Republic of Germany was selected as the 
subject of analysis for numerous reasons. First, it is the 
most populous and industrialized nation of Western Europe. 
Second, its level of industrialization is rivaled only by 
France and Britain. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the 
abyssmal condition of Germany after the Second World War 
created (particularly in the western sectors) the opportunity 
to begin the political resocialization of the people with 
what could be called "a clean slate."
Co-determination in industrial decision-making has 
been a goal of the German (West German after 19 45) labor
3 ' ■Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969),
p. 161.
5movement and of its political ally, the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD), almost since their inception in 1875. The 
struggle to assure worker representation on the boards of 
industrial and other enterprises reached a milestone on 
July 1, 1976, when legislation extending the coverage of
4worker "Mitbestimmung" (co-determination) went into effect.
The event did not give rise to any wild jubilation within the 
German Trade Union Federation (DGB) or within the SPD, for 
the 19 76 co-determination law did not provide for full-parity 
representation for labor with managers and shareholders as 
demanded by both the DGB and the SPD. Instead the law 
arranged matters in such a way that on issues on which labor 
and capital representatives disagreed, the latter would pre­
vail.
This deficiency of the 1976 law, from the employees' 
perspective, can be traced chiefly to the fact that the 
coalition of the SPD and the Free Democratic Party (FPD), 
which has governed the Federal Republic of Germany since 1969, 
had not been able to disagree on the terms of the co-deter­
mination legislation. The Free Democratic Party, representing
4While the emphasis of this thesis is on West Germany, 
hence post-1945, the historical development of the German 
labor movement and its relation to the post-1945 institution 
of co-determination cannot be neglected. Recommended sources 
on the pre-19 45 German labor movement include: Gerlad D.
Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany: 1914-1918 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Fritz Fischer, 
War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911-1914 (New York: 
Norton Press, 1975); and Richard N. Hunt, The Creation of the 
Weimar Republic: Still Born Democracy? (Lexington, MA: D.C. 
Heath and Company, 1969).
6mainly business and professional people, had resisted full-
parity co-determination until the end and had forced a
5
compromise formula on its larger, coalition partner. That 
the political climate on such matters had probably been 
assessed correctly by the FPD was confirmed by the results 
of the national elections held on October 3, 19 76, in which 
the so-called social-liberal coalition of SPD and FDP barely 
retained power. The opposition Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU) and its Bavarian counterpart, the Christian Social 
Union (CSU), captured 48.6 percent of the popular vote and 
reduced the SPD-FPD majority in the Bundestag from forty-six 
to ten seats.
Neither the passage of the 19 76 law nor the results 
of the two subsequent elections has assuaged the demands of 
the unions for full-parity co-determination. The conviction 
that only by gaining a fully equal voice with management 
could industrial democracy be achieved is deeply rooted in 
the West German labor movement. But a full understanding 
of this phenomenon cannot be attempted without working 
definitions which describe the terminology of co-determination.
Industrial democracy is the transfer of political 
democracy to the workplace. Co-determination is the
5Guido Goldman, The German Political System (New York: 
Random House, Inc., 1974), p. 138.
^E.C.M. Cullingford, Trade Unions in West Germany 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976), p. 95.
7realization of some aspects of political democracy in the
workplace, such as: one man, one vote; representative
government which is freely elected; responsibility and
7accountability; and the right of petition. In order to 
establish and maintain co-determination, it is necessary to 
have some form of organizational infrastructure, and all 
national variations of co-determination have a similar in­
frastructure to that of West Germany’s, with only slight
g
deviations. The infrastructure of co-determination within 
a typical West German joint-stock company will consist of 
the general meeting, the supervisory board, the management 
board, the labor director, and the works council.
The general meeting is a meeting of the shareholders. 
Usually the meeting takes place once a year, at which time 
the voting right is determined by the amount of shares a 
person owns. The general meeting is above all responsible 
for the following matters: any increases or decreases in
capital; any change in form, merger, or dissolution of the 
company; election and dismissal of supervisory board members; 
utilization of the annual profit; and the approval of acts of 
the management board and supervisory board. In reality,
7
David Jenkins, Job Power: Blue and White Collar 
Democracy (New York and Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1974), 
pp. 3-4.
^Roger Harrison, Worker’s Participation in Western 
Europe: 19 76 (London: Institute of Personnel Management,
1976), passim.
8however, its legal and factual possibilities of exerting in­
fluence are by far fewer than one would assume on the basis 
of this catalogue of formal rights.
The supervisory board, in practice, has a consider­
ably stronger position than the general meeting. Its major 
tasks are the appointment and dismissal of the management 
board as well as the supervision of the company*s management. 
Moreover, the bylaws of the company or the supervisory board 
itself may provide that certain matters require the consent 
of the supervisory board. It is quite usual that investment 
and extensions above a certain financial volume, credits and 
loans above a certain limit, as well as the recruitment and 
dismissal of managerial staff will require supervisory board 
consent. For all reasons the supervisory board, which in 
contrast to the general meeting meets twice to four times a 
year, has considerable influence on the fundamental managerial 
decisions of the company.
The management board conducts the day-to-day business 
of the company on its own cognizance. It has not only entre­
preneurial functions in the narrow sense of the word but also 
functions as a supervisor of the company’s employees. The 
functions of the management board are assigned to its indi­
vidual members so that each member is responsible for a par­
ticular field (i.e., technical, commercial, and financial 
matters) or for a particular division of the company. Irre­
spective of his/her special tasks, each management board
9member is responsible for overall company policy within the 
factory or plant.
A labor director (or workers1 director) is to be 
appointed as a full member of the management board. The 
labor director is appointed under the same conditions as 
other members of the management board, e.g., by the super­
visory board. Therefore, employees have no veto power. The 
labor director has specific competences in staff and social 
matters also. These include: arranging sick-leave; prepar­
ing vacation packages; and allocating over-time work to 
employees.
The works council safeguards the interests of the 
employees in dealings with the employer. Works councils are 
to be elected for a term of office of three years in any 
company of private industry with at least five employees 
which have voting rights. An employee is considered to have 
voting rights if he/she is an adult and works full-time. 
Employers and managerial employees are not represented on the 
works council. Works councils have far-reaching rights of 
participation and co-determination in matters concerning the 
structuring, organization and design of jobs, operations and 
the working environment, manpower planning and personnel
9
Taking account of the special interests of both 
young employees, who usually have not yet completed their 
training, and of the disabled, the works council provides for 
youth delegations and representatives of the disabled to look 
after the interests of these categories of employees.
10
management, as well as in-plant training. The works councils 
have a genuine right of co-determination in a series of mat­
ters such as: working hours, e.g., the introduction of
short-time work; the introduction and use of technical de­
vices designed to monitor the behavior or performance of the 
employees; the assignment and notice to vacate company-owned 
accommodations; and the fixing of job and bonus rates and 
comparable performance related remuneration.^
"Reform from above, rather than revolution from 
below" has been the political maxim of Germany since the 
advent of the Second Reich, and it is no different today in 
West Germany. The West Germans have shown a propensity to 
avoid domestic and industrial conflict whenever possible. 
Consequently, they have placed enormous faith in legislation 
and mediation to resolve many social and political problems. 
Since the scope and content of West German social legislation 
is very inclusive and extremely detailed, an inspection of
the entire subject would be lengthy and out of place consid-
11ering the subject of this thesis. What is proposed is an 
examination of the most important and relevant legislation
Adolf Strumthal, Workers Councils: A Study of Work­
place Organization on Both Sides of the Iron Curtain (Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 63.
11See Hajo Holborn, Germany and Europe: A Historical 
Essay (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1970) and 
Richard N. Hunt, German Social Democracy: 1918-19 33 (New 
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 196 4).
concerning co-determination. Chapter Two will provide a 
historical perspective of the German (after World War II, 
the West German) labor movement in relation to its goal of 
industrial democracy. What is necessary is to develop the 
salient factors in the labor movement that have been the 
most influential in labor's acceptance of co-determination as 
a way of industrial life.
The third chapter will examine co-determination 
legislation passed by the West Germany Parliament, providing 
a critical analysis of both the content and intent of these 
laws which are not numerous, but legalistic and complex. 
Within the parameters of these laws, all subsequent legisla­
tion has been enacted. The affectations of the major co­
determination laws upon West Germany have reshaped many 
aspects of society. Significantly, co-determination has 
given substance to aspirations for industrial democracy in 
modern post-industrialized West Germany.
Chapter Four discusses the policy and institutional 
implications and effects of co-determination participation 
in the current socio-political realm of West Germany. In 
other words, can participation of workers be effective within 
the traditional authority structure of contemporary industry? 
Following from that, should workplace participation be en­
couraged as a means of allowing the worker to become
democratized? The answers to these questions will provide an
12
indication of the current status of industrial democracy 
within the context of post-industrial society and serve as a 
departure point for evaluating the possibility of enhancing 
democracy, in general, through the structure of co-determina- 
tion. My analysis is directed towards the goal of a better 
understanding of the potential of industrial participation 
(co-determination) and the possibility that participation 
at the workplace will lead to increased participation in the 
political decision-making.
Some often neglected aspects of industrial democracy 
will be the subject of Chapter Five. Perhaps the most 
neglected aspect is what effect does industrial democracy 
have upon the "minorities" of the industrial workforce?
Migrant and immigrant workers are two of the "minorities," 
people who have been treated as industrial cannon-fodder by 
the employers, governments, and even labor unions in the so- 
called "host" country. Women, as an increasingly larger part 
of the workforce, are also of special concern. The partici­
pation of married women in the process of industrial democracy 
is dramatically restricted by their socialization and the 
basic fact that they often bear the burden of two full-time 
jobs: one as a housewife and mother, and the other as an
employee.
Thus Chapter Six will serve two functions. The first 
function will be an evaluation of the thesis. Has co-deter­
mination been successful in establishing industrial democracy
13
in West Germany? And, has democratization of the workplace 
been beneficial to political democracy, in a reciprocal re­
lationship? The second function will be to examine the 
relevance of the West German experience, with its particular 
form of industrial democracy, co-determination, as a guide 
and model for other nations of the industrial world.
Participation, co-determination, and industrial 
democracy are not a panacea. The possibility that through 
participation in the industrial decision-making process 
Western man may be able to achieve a higher state of ration­
ality and objectivity may be utopian fantasy. Given growing 
alienation, apathy, and economic stagnation, industrial 
democracy may be a social experiment that failed. Co-deter­
mination in West Germany has been in effect for little over 
three decades. In other nations of the West, co-determina- 
tion (or industrial democracy in any of its forms) has had a 
much more brief existence. Perhaps a sufficient amount of 
time has not transpired for a complete examination and evalu­
ation of industrial democracy. However, there is a need for 
at least an initial investigation of what industrial democ­
racy has accomplished in West Germany.
14
CHAPTER II
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CO-DETERMINATION 
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
For over one hundred years, the German labor movement 
has sought for workers not only political recognition through 
political parties and industrial recognition through trade 
unions, but representation in the governing bodies of indust­
rial enterprises, generally under the slogan of "Mitbestim- 
mung" (loosely translated as worker participation).  ^ The 
fact is that since the days of the Weimar Republic, the 
German labor movement has been successful in establishing a 
trade union structure and works councils in industrial or­
ganizations, and since World War II has been able to place 
worker representatives on the governing boards of industrial 
enterprises, in varying numbers and with greater or lesser 
successes in having these representatives effectively voice 
and instigate worker demands.
Given this history, the questions this chapter will 
examine are these: what has been the record of the German
labor movement in achieving worker participation? Why have
Hif. Michael Blumenthal, Co-determination in the 
German Steel Industry: A Report of Experience (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 15.
15
the demands for co-determination taken the particular forms 
associated with the German labor movement? What difference, 
if any, has co-determination had on the functioning of the 
West German economy?
West Germanyfs reconstruction after World War II was
not a new beginning in all aspects of politics and society,
but a reemergence of some very important and persistent
elements of past German life. Perhaps the most important of
these were the twin institutions of the labor movement: its
political party, the SPD, and its industrial organization,
the unified trade union movement. To be sure, the present
German Trade Union Federation (Deutsche Gewerkschaftbund or
DGB) differs somewhat from its pre-19 33 predecessors, but the
major orientation of the trade unions did not change appre- 
2
ciably. What is most significant in that pre-19 33 structure 
that has survived and that merits attention in understanding 
the developments of the post-war period?
The German labor movement was the principal focus of 
the major issues confronting socialism before 1914: revolu­
tionary versus evolutionary socialism, expressed in the
3contrasting views of Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein.
2 .Richard Grunberger, The 12-Year Reich: A Social 
History of Nazi Germany (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971),
pp. G-7.
3A.J. Ryder, Twentieth-Century Germany: From Bismarck 
to Brandt (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p.
46.
16
It is not much of an exaggeration to say that in the case of
the German labor movement, the voice was often that of
Kautsky, but the hand was that of Bernstein; that is to say,
the program and the rhetoric were those of Kautsky, but the
movement in action was an evolutionary one, eventually aban-
4doning the Marxist tradition in 1959. Until 1918 and even 
to 19 33, the voice of the SPD was that of class struggle and 
conflict, and as long as it retained that voice, the SPD 
sought in vain the achievement of majority party status,
A second important aspect of the German labor move­
ment was its rapid bureaucratization. The labor movement, 
which originated in a spirit of revolution against the exist­
ing state and bureaucracy, seemed to adopt quickly the central 
features of the system that the movement was dedicated to
5
opposing. How rapidly this bureaucratization of party and 
trade union took shape can be judged by the fact that Robert 
Michels1 classic statement of the iron law of oligarchy bears 
the date 1915, and the subject of his inquiry was the German 
labor movement,^ This bureaucratic heritage continues to 
leave its mark on the contemporary labor movement. The
4Helga Grebing, The History of the German Labor Move­
ment; A Survey (London: Oswald Wolff, 1969), p. 181.
5E.C.M. Cullmgford, Trade Unions m  West Germany 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976), pp. 11-12.
^Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological 
Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy 
(New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 342-357.
17
tightness of organization, the discipline that reaches upward, 
in the degree of obedience to national union leadership con­
stitutes one of the strengths of contemporary organizations. 
Party and trade unions do not always speak or act in unison, 
but when they do they constitute a major force in the polity.
A third historical element that will aid' in under­
standing the contemporary labor movement is its commitment 
to industrial democracy. The most dramatic and significant 
form of this commitment was the ’Works Council Movement, "
through which the workers desired to take into their own hands
7the direction not only of industry, but also the state. The 
Works Council Movement in Germany was clearly a part of a 
wider social phenomenon: rejection of parliamentary govern­
ment and the territorial state, which found expression in 
Russian soviets and, though in a very different form, Italian 
corporatism. Here corporatism is defined as "of or pertain­
ing to a political system under which the principal economic 
functions, as banking, industry, labor, etc., are organized 
as corporate unities.” Yet when the Hohenzollern Monarchy 
collapsed and the leaders of the SPD took over the state 
machinery, they found themselves comfortable in their new 
bureaucratic roles, and in short order were at odds with the 
Works Council Movement, which threatened the power base the 
SPD had just acquired. The SPD was not prepared to overturn
7
Nabagopal Das, Experiments m  Industrial Democracy 
(New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964), pp. 66-68.
18
completely the government and administrative machinery that 
seemed to be bulwarks against chaos, and in the end the 
works councils were restricted to an intra-enterprise scope
g
of action. However, within that context, the works 
councils became an established element in German industrial 
organization, though clearly stripped of most of their 
functional characteristics. In this they probably fared no 
worse than the Russian soviets and much better than the 
Italian corporations. But it is this heritage that has 
given the German works councils their staying power and that 
accounts for the manner in which they seem to fit easily 
into the FRGrs social structure.
One of the more dramatic elements of German recon­
struction after 1945 was the reemergence of the SPD and the 
trade union organizations. Though treated with more or less 
favor, depending on the policies of the occupying power,
party and unions provided a framework for the reinstitution
g
of organized political and economic action. Because these 
institutions continue to function in the FRG, one more nearly 
appreciates their role in reconstruction. What is almost 
forgotten today is that the social climate in the western 
occupation zones of Germany was decidedly anti-capitalist 
and strongly reformist. Clauses authorizing socialization of
g
Sturmthal, Workers Councils, p. 54.
9
Herbert J. Spiro, The Politics of German Codeter­
mination (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 21.
19
the means of production were written into some of the early 
state constitutions (Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia), and 
these clauses advocated far-reaching restraints on the 
capitalist s y s t e m . P a r t l y  this reflected the social con­
cerns of the Roman Catholic church expressed in the ency­
clicals of Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius XI, but the shame and 
horror felt in western Germany after the demise of Hitler's 
regime also played a role in producing a liberal, reformist 
climate of opinion, not duplicated since those early years of 
reconstruction. ^
The reform impetus reached its peak in 1951 when the
passage of legislation setting up worker participation in the
12governing councils of the coal and steel industries. After 
that, only minor adjustments were made in provisions for 
worker participation in industrial decision-making, and even 
the 1976 laws fall considerably short of parity co-determina­
tion, the ultimate goal of the labor movement. Under the 
dual impact of the "economic miracle" and the long tenure of 
Konrad Adenauer and the CDU, West Germany's social climate 
became increasingly conservative, with twenty-five years 
elapsing between the coal and steel bill and the present 
extension of worker participation. Thus the SPD and the
10 . . .Spiro, The Politics of German Codetermination, p.
37.
*^Ibid. , p . 58 .
12Blumenthal, Co-determination xn the German Steel 
Industry, pp. 18-21.
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trade unions became integrated into the FRG's polity and 
society.
Features of the Federal Republic of Germany that help 
define the significance of industrial democracy are the 
following. Persistent assertations of the CDU governing 
elite and of its U.S. supporters notwithstanding, what one 
can observe in the FRG is not simply a traditional market 
economy, or even a social market economy where the government 
has more control over production, but the emergence of demo­
cratic corporatism--perhaps pluralistic corporatism would be 
more accurate. Therefore, while the FRG meets many of the 
normative standards of a post-industrial, democratic politi­
cal system, its socio-economic patterns are essentially 
corporatist; that is to say, social and economic actions take
place in a framework of legally defined and publicly sanc-
13tioned functional organizations. Within this context, 
what has actually developed in West Germany is a pluralistic 
political system in which the major parties are based in good 
part, though not entirely, on class voting. In the 19 72 
national election the SPD had been able to attract white- 
collar, middle class voters. But in the state elections held 
between 1972 and 1976, and in the 1976 and 1980 national 
elections, many of these swing voters seemed to have returned
13Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: 
Modernization, Development and Politics," Comparative 
Politics 3:3 (April 1971), pp. 282-322.
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14to their natural conservative homeland in the CDU/CSU.
In this respect the Federal Republic of Germany must 
be distinguished from the group politics system of the United 
States. Certainly the appearances are similar; in both, 
there are labor organizations, business organizations, relig­
ious groups, and so on, attempting to influence public policy. 
In the United States patterns of participation are relatively 
amorphous and organized groups have independent rights of in­
put, social life, and economic decision-making, which to a 
certain extent have no connection with individual organiza­
tions. The participation may be as casual or as formal as 
the particular groups decide upon.
In West Germany, by contrast, functional organiza­
tions in society and economy have structures, procedures, 
and so forth defined by law, and their interactions take 
place in the confines of governmental procedures. Further­
more, these functional organizations are entitled to be 
consulted and have a significant voice in shaping public
policy regarding their particular economic or social 
15sectors. Seen from either a "right" or "left" perspective, 
worker participation in industrial decision-making might be 
no more than a clever device to calm and co-opt the workers1 
demands. But perceived from the strong tradition of socio-
■^Stephen Smith, "The Politics of Success," Time, 
October 13, 1980, p. 60.
15Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, p.
197.
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economic corporatism, demands to have worker representatives 
on enterprise boards is a legitimate method of making demands 
and assuring their satisfaction in a corporatist system.
Much of the debate involving co-determination becomes unin­
telligible when seen from the viewpoint of industrial 
relations in Great Britain or the United States. It requires 
the historical context of the German (after World War Two the 
West German) labor movement and contemporary West German 
politics to gain an accurate investigation of these develop­
ments .
One final element of the post-1949 historical con­
text must be specified: the dynamics of coalition politics,
already briefly noted, which has shaped the impetus of 
national policy since 1966. Initially with the "Great 
Coalition" of 1966-1969, the SPD, participating in the 
government for the first time since the Weimar Republic,
attempted to change the FRG along lines congenial to its
16own basic ideology and policy preferences. The "Great
Coalition" was succeeded in 1969 by the present governing
coalition in which the SPD became the senior partner, but
remained dependent on the FPD for a majority of the 
17Bundestag. After having successfully tackled "Ostpolitik"
■^Guido Goldman, The German Political System, p. 116. 
17The narrow margin by which the social-liberal coali­
tion remains in power at the national level is further compli­
cated by the manner in which the federal system divides power 
without necessarily dividing responsibility in the same 
measure.
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in the first three years of its tenure, the social-liberal 
coalition then attempted to enact major domestic policy re­
forms, but with little success, for the bipartisan agreement 
on "Ostpolitik" was replaced by persistent and often major 
disagreement on social policy. As a result, the SPD was un­
able to redeem more than a fraction of the far-reaching 
social programs on which it had contested the 1976 election: 
co-determination, profit sharing, and urban land use regula­
tion. The present coalition has definitely abandoned any 
hope for the last two, in good part because of the energy 
crisis and the subsequent economic slow-down. To what extent 
it was able to pass worker participation legislation that 
approached the full-parity goal of the trade unions will be 
examined in Chapter Three. It is in this historical context 
that one may approach an analysis and understanding of co­
determination legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany.
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CHAPTER III
THE PRESENT LEGAL STATUS OF CO-DETERMINATION 
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
It may appear to be rather perplexing to an outside 
observer of the West German labor relations scene that the 
post-World War Two political struggle over labor co-determina­
tion has resulted in the enactment of three different pieces 
of legal regulations, with differing coverage and varying 
degrees of labor participation in the managing of business 
firms. However, this seems to be typical of the West Germans 
to resolve labor-management disputes with legislation. This 
chapter will present the major laws and amendments concerning 
co-determination and workers1 participation in West German 
industry.
After the Second World War, the West German trade 
unions, congenial with the declared intentions of the British 
occupying forces, endorsed proposals to nationalize the 
"montan" industries (mining and iron and steel producing 
industries) in the British occupied zone.'*" The changing 
socio-economic climate during the ensuing years showed, how­
ever, that such a solution was politically unattainable, and
^Jenkins, Job Power, pp. 116-119.
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a compromise was found in a somewhat different direction.
British control had brought about a full-parity solution
that amounted to an equal share of seats for the shareholders
and the employees in the supervisory council of the de-
2
cartelized business firms, m  the montan industries.
Furthermore, the unions obtained the right to nominate
candidates for the newly established position of the so-
called labor director, an equal-ranking member of corporate
3
executive boards.
The first post-war West German Bundestag of 19 49 saw 
an unexpected majority for the conservative parties (CDU,
CSU, FPD, and German Party, as well as several splinter par­
ties) , viz. 256 seats as opposed to 146 seats for the left 
bloc, which was comprised of the SPD (131) and the German 
Communist Party (KPD) (15). The preliminary parity solution 
for the montan industry, introduced under the auspices of 
the British occupation forces, was endangered. Under the 
massive threat of nationwide strikes, and after heated dis­
cussion in and out of the Bundestag, the West German govern­
ment was forced to single out the montan complex for separate 
legislative treatment. The post-war controversy over co­
determination in the montan industry culminated in the "Act
2W. Michael Bluenthal, Co-determination m  the German 
Steel Industry, p. 19,
3
F.E. Emery and Einar Thorsrud, Form and Content m  
Industrial Democracy: Some Experiences from Norway and Other 
European Countries (London: Tavistock Publications Ltd.,
1964), pp. 44-47.
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on Co-determination of Employees in the Supervisory Councils
and Executive Boards of the Business Firms in the Mining and
Iron and Steel Producing Industries" of 1951, the Montan 
4Act.
The Act applies to all firms in the mining and iron
and steel industries if they are operated under the charter
of a corporation, are a limited liability company or a joint
company of mine owners, and if they have in general more than
51,000 employees. If the firm's charter does not require the 
institution of a supervisory board, such a board has now to 
be organized. The supervisory board consists of eleven 
elected members, whereby both the shareholders and the em­
ployees respectively nominate four members and an additional 
external member each. The law stipulates that the external 
members may be neither a representative of a trade union nor 
of an employer organization nor employed by that firm or
g
otherwise connected with it in some economic way.
The electing body for all nominated members of the 
supervisory board is the shareholders* general meeting, 
which usually convenes twice yearly. The general meeting
4
The Montan Act is reprinted m  International Labor 
Organization, Co-determination in the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 19 76), 
cited hereafter as ILO.
5ILO, Montan Act, 1951, part 1, section 1, para­
graphs 1 and 2, pp. 76, 77.
^ILO, Montan Act, 1951, part 2, section 4, para­
graphs 1 and 2, pp. 77, 78.
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approves the nominees and elects the owners1 representatives 
and confirms the nominations and elects the employers1 re­
presentatives. Two of the employees' five representatives 
are nominated by the works council, whereby one representa­
tive must come from the group of salaried employees and the 
other from the group of wage-earning employees. It is
interesting to note that the unions concerned can veto the 
7 . .nominations. The remaining three board members, i.e., the 
two further employee representatives and the external, 
additional member for the labor bloc, are nominated by the 
unions, with no veto power for the works council. Altogether, 
only two of the employees’ five representatives on the super­
visory board must come from the firm under consideration. In 
addition, labor’s direct preference is restricted by the
g
union’s veto right.
The Montan Act also stipulates the nomination of the 
so-called neutral member, chosen by the directly elected 
members of the supervisory board. This eleventh member— the 
fifteenth or the twenty-first member for extended boards, 
cases that will be considered shortly--deserves special 
attention. The neutral member will be elected by majority 
vote of the board members, whereby at least three of the
7
ILO, Montan Act, 19 51, part 2, section 6, para­
graphs 1-5, pp. 78-79.
g
Thomas Kennedy, European Labor Relations (Lexington, 
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Co., 1980), p. 186.
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employees1 and three of the shareholders1 representatives 
have to support his election. The notion behind the concept 
of the neutral member is to prevent possible stalemate situ­
ations and to endorse the ’’public" interest in the decision-
9
making process of the modern capitalistic enterprise.
In accordance with West German corporate laws, the 
supervisory board appoints the management board. The super­
visory board elects the so-called labor director, a full and 
equal member of the management board but depending in a 
special way on the trust of labor’s representatives. The 
labor director cannot be elected against the votes of the 
majority of the employees’ members in the supervisory 
board.^ But the law does not specify in a concrete and 
clearcut way the labor director's tasks and responsibilities. 
Only by assigning distinct areas to the different members of 
the management board is the scope of activities for the labor 
director implicitly demarcated. In practice, the labor di­
rector is responsible for personnel and social matters.
In previous discussion it was assumed that the super­
visory board had eleven members. If a firm's nominal capital 
exceeds 20 million DM (approximately $10 million U.S.), the 
maximum number on the board is fifteen. If the nominal
9
Nabagopal Das, Experiments in Industrial Democracy,
p. 73.
■^ILO, Montan Act, 1951, part 3, section 13, para­
graphs 1 and 2, p. 82.
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capital is higher than 50 million DM (approximately $25 mil­
lion U.S.), the electing bodies may appoint twenty-one 
members. The change in the number of board members involves 
a change in the composition of the employees* representatives. 
In the case of fifteen board members, the works council 
nominates three, viz. one salaried employee and two wage- 
earning employees, and the unions nominate four members, 
including the additional external member.^^ In the case of 
twenty-one members, the works council nominates a further 
wage-earning employee, and the unions have the option for six
candidates. The general rules for the election of the neutral
12member apply without change.
As already mentioned, special historical circumstances 
combined with massive political pressures forced the first 
West German government to single out the montan complex for 
special legislative treatment. The next important legisla­
tion, the social constitution for all firms of the private 
economic sector, the Works Constitution Act, was enacted in 
1952, one year after the introduction of the Montan Act,
which remains lex specialis on the issue of managerial co-
13determination for the montan industries. The Montan Act
■^ILO, Montan Act, 1951, part 2, section 9, para­
graph 1, p. 81.
12ILO, Montan Act, 1951, part 2, section 9, para­
graph 2, p. 81.
13ILO, Montan Act, 1951, pp. 93-98.
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fell short of original union aspirations and their far-
reaching implications. There is little wonder that the
trade unions considered this legislative framework only as
an uneasy compromise or an intermediate step in the process
of what they call ’democratization" of the economy, a con-
14ceptual analogy to their political system.
The Works Constitution Act provides general regula­
tions for three different levels of employee participation 
and co-determination in all firms outside the montan indus­
tries with at least five, full-time, adult employees. The 
first level concerns the independent rights of the single 
employee on the personal stage, e.g., rights to information, 
hereing and discussion of issues concerning the workshop 
place, fields of activity, remuneration, and so on. At the 
plant level, the act prescribes the institution of a works 
council, an independent representative body of all employees, 
which is required if the firm has five or more permanent em­
ployees. In addition to this, if the company is employing
more than five adolescents (persons under 18 years old), a
15youth council has to be established.
On the decision-making level of the whole firm, 
finally, participation in management found a general
14Cullmgford, Trade Unions in West Germany, p. 67.
15 ,The Works Constitution Act of 1952 is reprinted m
International Labor Organization, Co-determination in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (Geneva: International Labor 
Organization, 1976), hereafter cited as ILO, Works Constitu­
tion Act, 1952.
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regulation. Under the Works Constitution Act, one-third of
the members of the supervisory board must be labor repre-
16sentatives who are elected by the firm's employees.
Before the enactment of the Co-determination Act of
1976, which sets apart large firms for special regulation
without invalidating the Montan Act, the Works Constitution
Act provided the general legislative framework for the co-
17determination issue m  West Germany. In this context, the
main provision on co-determination is employees being denied
parity on supervisory boards. In its 1952 version and the
18Amendment of 19 72, the act stipulates one-third worker 
co-determination for corporations and partnerships limited 
by shares, as well as for limited liability companies, joint 
companies of mine owners, and business co-operatives with 
more than five hundred employees. If the business charter 
does not already require the institution of a supervisory 
board, such a board has to be established. Exceptions from 
the one-third co-determination are made for family corpora­
tions with less than five hundred employees, for so-called 
"tendenct" firms (i.e., business firms with political, union­
ist, denominational, charitable, educational, scientific, or
16ILO, Works Constitution Act, 1952, division 5, 
section 76, paragraph 1, p. 96.
17ILO, Works Constitution Act, pp. 46-72.
1 8 ILO, Works Constitution Act, 1952, pp. 103-192.
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artistic aims or serving purposes of reporting or expressing
opinion) and for religious groups and their charitable and
19educational institutions.
If the firmfs charter prescribes six supervisory 
board members, which requires two labor representatives, only 
employees of the firm under consideration are eligible for 
the supervisory board. In the cases of more employee repre­
sentatives, at least two must be members of the respective 
firm. Additional members may be added from outside, e.g., 
from the unions. It is interesting to note that under the 
1952 Works Constitution Act the unions have neither a right 
to nominate the internal employee candidates nor a right to 
advise the employees on that matter. Even the rights of the 
works council are rather restricted in this context. Having
only the same rights as other employee groupings, the works
20council may simply propose a list of candidates. The 
candidates for the supervisory board are elected by all em­
ployees according to the rules of direct proportional voting. 
The voting procedure does not provide different treatment for 
salaried and wage-earning employees. The only structural 
qualification concerning the list of candidates stems from 
the fact that the federal legislators felt the interests of
19 . . . .ILO, Works Constitution Act, 1952, division 5,
section 76, paragraph 6, p. 97.
20ILO, Works Constitution Act, 19 52, division 5, 
section 76, paragraph 3, p. 97.
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female employees better safeguarded by female representatives
on the board. If the firm has more than fifty percent female
employees, at least one of the employees* representatives on
21the supervisory board has to be female.
In the years after the introduction of the Montan Act, 
the structure of West Germany's economy changed considerably. 
Certain business firms that had been subject to the Montan 
Act underwent so many structural changes that they no longer 
fitted that act's criteria. To prevent these firms from es­
caping the Montan Act's original legal requirements and 
thereby becoming subject to the one-third parity requirement 
of the Works Constitution Act, the federal legislators issued
several amendments, collectively referred to as the Co-
22determination Protection Acts.
The first of these amendments was the 1956 Supplement 
Act on Co-determination (Act to Supplement the Acts on Co­
determination of Employees in the Supervisory Boards and
Management Boards of the Business Firms in Mining and Iron
23and Steel Producing Industries). This act is more commonly 
referred to as the Amendment on Holding Companies. For 
corporations, limited liability companies, or joint stock
21ILO, Works Constitution Act, 1952, division 5, 
section 76, paragraph 2, pp. 96-9 7. See Sturmthal, Works 
Councils, pp. 65-66.
22Harrison, Workers' Participation in Western Europe,
p. 42.
23ILO, pp. 83-92.
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companies which dominate a business firm that falls under the 
Montan Act of 1951, the Amendment on Holding Companies applies 
as follows. If the production activities of the dominating 
firm fall themselves under the criteria of application for 
the Montan Act, the Montan Act of course remains directly 
applicable. If this is not the case, but the production of 
the business combined is significantly determined by the pro­
duction of firms falling under the provisions of the act of
1951, the holding amendment of 1956 prescribes that the Mon-
24tan Act applies to the dominating firm also.
This amendment brings about some important legisla­
tive changes from the original version of the Montan Act. It 
must be recalled that in the Montan Act the works council 
nominated two candidates for the election to the supervisory 
board, with a veto right for the unions concerned. The Amend­
ment on Holding Companies introduces a primary election,
whereby the electors are directly chosen by the firm's em- 
25 . .ployees. The position of the unions is significantly 
reduced, because with, in general, fifteen members on the 
supervisory board the unions retain nominating right for only 
three members (as compared to four according to the Montan 
Act). In addition to this, the union veto power concerning 
the candidates of the union's persuasion become more
24ILO, Amendment on Holding Companies, article 1, 
section 2, p. 84.
25ILO, Amendment on Holding Companies, article 1, 
section 6, paragraphs 3 and 4, p. 86, 87.
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independent of the unions because their removal from office
2 g
is rendered more difficult. A court order, pending sub­
mittal of an important reason for the planned removal, must 
first be realized. However, the position of the shareholders 
is somewhat strengthened, because under the new provisions 
the labor director may be elected against the votes of the 
labor representatives on the supervisory board.
The second amendment to the Montan Act was the 196 7
27Modification Act to the Co-determination Act. The major 
criteria of the amendment1s applicability was if the sales 
revenue from mining or iron and steel producing activities 
of a business firm fell below fifty percent of the total 
revenue during two consecutive years, the dominant firm 
would, under the Amendment on Holding Companies, drop out of 
the Montan Act?s regulation and would therefore be subject 
to the less restrictive jurisdiction of the Works Constitu­
tion Act, with only one-third worker parity on the supervisory 
board.
The controversy over decision-making and co-determin- 
ation of employees in West Germany found its apogee in the 
Act on the Co-determination of Employees, which was passed in
2 6ILO, "Amendment on Holding Companies," 1956, 
article 1, section 10, paragraph 1, p. 89.
27Z. Almanasreh, "Institutional Forms of Worker 
Participation in the Federal Republic of Germany," in The 
Economics of Co-determination, ed. David F. Heathfield 
(London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 19 77).
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2 81976. This act, a somewhat moderated version of the Montan 
Act, applies to large firms not affected by earlier legisla­
tion. Two observations must be stated at the beginning.
First, the Montan Act is not annulled by the legislation of 
1976, for this law explicitly excludes those business firms 
for which co-determination is settled by the Montan Act of 
1951 and the Co-determination Protection Acts of 1956 and 
1967. Second, the one-third parity provisions under the 
Works Constitution Act of 1952 still apply for smaller-sized 
business firms not covered by the 19 76 Co-determination Act. 
As in the case of the 19 52 act, so-called tendency enter­
prises remain exempt. These are here defined as enterprises 
serving political, coalition political, denominational, 
charitable, educational, scientific, or artistic designations 
or purposes that are conducive to information or to expres­
sion of opinion as covered by article 5,1.2 of the West
29German Basic Law, Additionally, the Co-determination Act 
also excludes religious communities and their associated 
charitable and educational institutions.'^ With these
2 8The Co-determination Act of 19 76 is reprinted in 
ILO, Co-determination in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
cited hereafter as ILO, Co-determination Act of 1976.
29Article 5, section 1: "Everyone shall have the
right freely to express and disseminate his opinion by speech, 
writing and pictures and freely inform himself from generally 
accessible sources."
30ILO, Co-determination Act, 19 76, part 1, section 2, 
paragraph 4, p. 47.
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exemptions, the act applies to all business firms— i.e.,
firms employing in general more than two thousand employees—
that are operated under the legal charter of a corporation, a
partnership limited by shares, a limited-liability company, a
joint stock company of mine owners, or a business cooperative.
Indirect voting via an electoral committee will be
the rule if the number of employees exceeds eight thousand.
As known, indirect voting could favor organized interest
groups, e.g., the unions. The employees may, however, pass a
resolution for direct voting. Analogously, employees of a
firm with an employment level below eight thousand may decide
on the technically more efficient device of an electoral 
31committee. Voting for the salaried and the wage-earning 
employees will take place separately if no other resolution 
is passed by the employees. The number of electors for these 
two social groups is proportional to the respective number of 
employees in the business firm. As a specific, much debated 
provision under the 19 76 Co-determination Act, the group of 
salaried employees must include a proportional share of 
representatives of so-called managerial salaried employees,
1.e., the employees with management positions. The number of 
electoral representatives in the two groups, whereby one in­
cludes the sub-group of managerial salaried employees, is
31 *ILO, Co-determination Act, 1976, part 2, division
2, section 15, paragraphs 1-4, p. 57.
38
. . . . . . . 32qualified by a provision protecting minority interests.
The electoral group of the salaried employees must include at
33least one managerial salaried employee.
Electors of the two committees elect members of the 
supervisory board in separate pollings according to the rules 
of proportionate voting, but common voting may be decided 
upon. Once more, a rule protecting minority interests ap­
plies, and guarantees in the actual circumstance that at
least one member of the group of managerial salaried employ-
34ees will be on the supervisory board.
As under the Works Constitution Act, the unions have
neither a nominating right nor a veto right with respect to
the employees' representatives, all of which must be employed
at the firm under consideration. Finally, to benefit the
unions' interests, the supervisory board will be completed by
two members who are nominated by the unions and elected by
35the employees' electoral committee. In contrast to the 
election of the representatives of the two different social 
groups within the firm, the union members are elected jointly
32 . . . .ILO, Co-determination Act, 1975, division 2, sub­
division 4, section 20, paragraphs 1-3, p. 60.
33 . . .ILO, Co-determination Act, 1976, division 2, sub­
division 4, section 18, paragraph 2, p. 60.
34 . . .ILO, Co-determination Act, 19 76, division 2, sub­
division 3, section 15, paragraph 5, p. 58.
35 . . . .ILO, Co-determination Act, 1976, division 2, sub­
division 3, section 16, paragraphs 1 and 2, p. 59.
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by secret voting of all members of the electoral committee.
A supervisory board with a total of twelve members is
comprised of six representatives for the shareholders, four
for the employees, and two for the unions of the respective
industry, whereby the election of the employees' candidates
is qualified by the provision that at least one member of the
group of the managerial salaried employees must be represent-
3 6ed on the board.
The members of the supervisory board elect both a
chairperson and a deputy chairperson by a two-thirds majority
vote. If a majority is not achieved, the shareholders'
members elect the chairman and the employees1 members the 
37deputy. In general, members of the management board will
be elected by a majority of at least two-thirds of the
supervisory board. If such a majority cannot be obtained, a
simple majority of board members is sufficient. In case of
stalemate situations, the chairman of the supervisory board
will cast two ballots. It is interesting to note that the
new law does not specify any legal provision for election of
38a labor director.
The description applies to business firms with in
3 6ILO, Co-determination Act, 19 76, part 2, division 1, 
section 7, paragraph 2, p. 51.
37ILO, Co-determination Act, 1976, part 2, division 3, 
section 27, paragraphs 1-3, p. 65.
3 8But see: ILO, Co-determination Act, 19 76, part 3,
section 33, p. 68.
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general no more than ten thousand employees. Between 10,000 
and 20,000 employees, the number of supervisory board members 
amounts to sixteen, including eight labor candidates, of 
which only two are nominated by the unions. An additional 
candidate from the unions will be nominated if the board has 
a total number of twenty members. This will be the case if
39the total employment level is greater than 20,000 employees.
At least a few observations are in order about this 
most complex legislative machinery. The FPD was the princ­
ipal proponent of a separate seat on the worker side for the 
managerial staff. The trade unions considered it simply a 
method for assuring an employer-point-of-view majority on the
supervisory board, and it would take considerable anti-union
40partisanship to see this as anything else. The SPD, on the 
other hand, seemed to have been in favor of indirect elections 
because it believed the trade unions would be able to control 
the process for nominating electors. The employer side 
generally favored direct election, as it favored any sort of 
move that would reduce the influence of unions over the 
worker representatives.^
Though it might appear that the legislative provisions 
of the 1976 act do not necessarily derogate from the principle
39ILO, Co-determination Act, 19 76, part 2, division
1, section 7, paragraph 1, p. 50.
40E.C.M. Cullmgford, Trade Unions m  West Germany,
p . 83.
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of full-parity co-determination, the sections dealing with 
the chairpersonship of the supervisory board and with the 
method for breaking tie votes constitute such clear deroga­
tions. The chairperson and the deputy chairperson of the 
supervisory board must be elected by a two-thirds majority; 
assuming that in most cases a corporate manager is to be 
chairperson, they must be able to carry with them at least 
some worker votes. The same would hold true for the deputy 
chairperson, who might well be an employee representative. 
However, if two-thirds majority cannot be obtained, the
shareholder representatives elect the chairperson and the
42employee representatives elect the deputy chairperson.
Such an arrangement still might leave the board facing a tie 
vote. Then a second vote is taken and if the result is 
again a tie the chairperson has the tie-breaking vote. At 
this point it might be advantageous to observe that the 
coal and steel co-determination law (Montan Act) provides 
for parity representation, though it also adds a "neutral" 
member who could break ties. However, in the over thirty 
years of operation of the Montan Act, there has been no 
formal tie-breaking action by the neutral members. Critics 
might argue that no clearer proof is needed of the co-opting 
of the trade unions in the FRG; but the evidence also per­
mits the observation that frequent recourse to the neutral
42 . . . .ILO, Co-determination Act, 1976, part 2, division
3, section 27, paragraph 2.
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tie-breaker would quickly lead to very difficult industrial
relations problems for which mechanical tie-breaking devices
43will be of little use. Here, then, is the crux of the 
concern against any notion that the 19 76 legislation consti­
tuted parity co-determination. The full scope of the 
argument that full-parity co-determination would alter the 
system of property rights in the FRG, that it would be in 
violation of the Basic Law will be examined in Chapter Four,
A fuller understanding of the 1976 legislation can 
be obtained by viewing it as simply another step on the road 
to industrial democracy. The parentage of the 19 76 act is 
clearly shown by the Montan Act of 1951 and the 1952 Works 
Constitution Act. Both acts have been amended several times 
and both continue in force for the types of enterprises 
covered by them.
In the Montan Act!s legislation there is apparent 
parity on the supervisory board, but the addition of a 
neutral member provides a tie-breaking mechanism; however, 
that could rebound to the advantage of labor as well as 
management. One should note that the selection of the 
supervisory board has to pass through the annual share­
holders * meeting, with the works councils and the unions 
making their recommendations to this shareholder instrument. 
The principle of outside members of the supervisory board
43H.A. Clegg, A New Approach to Industrial Democracy 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell and Mott, Ltd., 1960), p. 51.
43
nominated by the trade unions was established here and was
incorporated into the 1976 law, but only after a prolonged
struggle. From the Montan legislation has also come the
institution of the management board's labor director, who is
nominated by the trade unions and has personnel policy re- 
44sponsibility. The 19 76 law divorced the labor director
from union nomination and personnel policy responsibilities,
though the SPD and the CDU are embroiled in a controversy
45over the intent of the legislation m  this respect.
The passage of the Montan Act marked the high-water 
mark of the push toward parity co-determination. The 1952 
Works Constitution Act provided for considerably less than 
its predecessor. Employee representatives were limited to 
one-third of the supervisory board membership and all the 
labor members had to come from within the enterprise; nobody 
on the management board directly represented labor in the 
day-to-day operation of the enterprise. One would be hard 
pressed to categorize the 1952 legislation as anything but a 
trifle tossed labor's way, and there is little evidence that 
one-third representation satisfied either the trade unions or 
that it had a significant impact on industrial relations. 
After 1966, and particularly after 1969, the social-liberal
44F.E. Emery and Einar Thorsrud, Form and Content m  
Industrial Democracy, p. 46.
45In fact the 19 76 Act was challenged and delayed in 
federal constitutional courts; it didn't actually become 
fully effective until 1979.
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coalition tried to strengthen the position and powers of the 
works councils while also pushing for full-parity co-deter­
mination. They succeeded in the former endeavor--there being 
intra-coalition agreement on the works councils— but clearly 
failed in the latter.
Consequently, the legislative machinery for industrial 
democracy in West Germany is varied. The variations in 
industrial democracy reach all the way from co-determination 
in small enterprises employing less than five persons, to the 
19 76 Co-determination Act which, it is estimated, will apply
to about six hundred enterprises, employing over four million 
46workers. Of the five laws, three provide for employee re­
presentation on supervisory boards, though taken collectively 
they employ only a minority of the work force. The other two 
laws provide for employee representation through the by now
traditional form of the works council, whose significance in
4 7industrial relations should not be minimized.
The public service sector utilizes a comparable 
device, the Personalrat (personnel board), which covers much 
the same ground as the works council in the private and semi- 
public sector. But with all the West German publicity about 
co-determination— the benefits claimed for it by its
46Z. Almanasreh, "Institutional Forms of Worker 
Participation in the Federal Republic of Germany," p. 111.
47H .A . Cegg, A New Approach to Industrial Democracy, 
pp. 103-105.
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proponents and the dire consequences predicted for political 
freedom and the survival of the capitalist order by its 
opponents-— well over half (two-thirds if the public service 
sector is included) of the work force do not enjoy the bene­
fits of this form of industrial democracy. They must be 
satisfied with representation through the works council or 
are deprived of any formal participation in the decision­
making process whatsoever.
Possibly one might gain some benefit from a more 
detailed examination of existing legislation, but whatever 
exists now or is planned for the future functions or will 
function in the legislative, structural framework of the 
FRG's polity, society and economy. Thus before a full 
critical evaluation of co-determination in West Germany can 
be achieved, it will be necessary to examine the effect that 
co-determination has had on the institutional structure of 
that nation.
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CHAPTER IV
CO-DETERMINATION IN WEST GERMANY: INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND EFFECTIVENESS
Aspects of institutional transformation that bear 
most directly on the nature of industrial democracy in the 
FRG are discussed below in decreasing order of importance 
with regard to co-determination. These are clearly not 
mutually exclusive aspects, but taken in their entirety 
should provide a reasonably adequate understanding of the 
status of industrial democracy in the context of modern West 
Germany.
West Germany and Democratic Corporatism
There is substantial evidence to support the concep­
tion of West Germany as a democratic, pluralistic society.
The question that remains is whether the movement toward co­
determination adds to the democratic quality of West German 
political structures. To the extent that the 1976 Co-deter- 
mination Act does not provide for full-parity co-determina­
tion, capitalist company law has not really been superseded. 
But the notion that in moving toward parity one moves toward
1Robert J. Kuhne, "Co-determmation: A Statutory 
Restructuring of the Organization," The Columbia Journal of 
World Business (Summer, 1979), 17-25.
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some new synthesis is basic to the present analysis of in­
stitutional change in the FRG.
Legally anchored and government-sponsored labor 
management relations take other forms than co-determination. 
For example, in the days of the Great Coalition, under the 
impact of an economic crisis during 1969, the Konzertierte 
Aktion (Concentrated Action) was developed, which is tri­
partite machinery for labor, management and government to
discuss economic trends and to shape short and intermediate
2
term wage and price policies. Labor has complained that the 
Aktion always produces much talk about how wages must be kept 
in check but often says little and does less about prices.
Yet the government does not simply impose itself on the two
partners in industrial relations, and the machinery of the 
Konzertierte Aktion contributes in some measure to the per­
sistence of corporative perspectives in West Germany. It is 
not possible to make an incontrovertible case for the struct­
uring of West German institutions and organizations along 
corporative lines, for very traditional state controls
exerted through the central West German banking structure
. . , . 3limits a strictly corporative framework.
2A.J. Ryder, Twentieth-Century Germany; From Bis­
marck to Brandt, pp. 511-513.
3Ralf Dahrendorf, "The New Germanies: Restoration, 
Revolution, Reconstruction," Arend Lijphart, ed. Politics in 
Europe; Comparisons and Interpretations (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 233-235.
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It can be safely stated that undeniable clout con­
tinues to be exercised by big business and industry in the
economic realm and influences the continuation of conserva-
4
tive qualities of West German political patterns. Further­
more, proposals for investment control by the central state 
authority would certainly undercut the political pluralism 
and social structuring of the FRG; proponents of such state 
control and direction of investment generally are found on 
the radical-to-moderate left, either inside the SPD or out­
side of it. However, to the extent that corporative features 
(i.e., functional associations and organizations, legally and 
rigidly applied patterns of participation within a defined 
context) can be identified in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
they would tend to be strengthened and reinforced by co­
determination .
Change in West German Politics 
Viewing the Federal Republic of Germany from a polit­
ical perspective, the seventeen year reign of Konrad Adenauer 
and his immediate successors made West Germany into what may 
be called a "CDU state," that is to say, a conservative state, 
socially, politically and economically. Certainly there is 
evidence of the abandonment of conservative materialistic 
attitudes due to generational cleavage in West Germany as in
4
Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy m  Germany, p.
417.
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other European nations, but the pervasive conservatism of 
West German society and politics is not really much in dis­
pute between those who take pride in it and those who condemn 
it. In this CDU state the SPD has never been able to gain a 
clear majority of votes and govern the nation unimpeded by 
coalition ties. Radical critics will probably suggest that 
even as the sole majority party the SPD would not have 
governed much differently from the record it has made since 
1966; no reliable response to such a proposition is possible. 
But there is no doubt that the slow and cautious advance 
toward parity co-determination must be traced in part to the 
inherent conservatism of West Germany and to the continuing 
need for coalition politics; the often bitter conflict be­
tween the coalition partners as the result of the FDP’s 
holding of a white-collar/executive's representative on the
supervisory board is evidence of the tension within the co- 
. . 5alition. The problems of the SPD in developing a consistent 
policy line in the socio-economic field can also be traced to 
intra-party tensions between the party’s mainstream personnel 
in city halls, state and federal parliaments, and the federal 
cabinet on one hand, and the party’s youthful constituency on 
the other.
Given the degree of inter-party in-fighting, it is 
not surprising that the SPD was unable to make good on most
5
Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: 
Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," The 
American Political Science Review, XLV (December, 19 71), 
991-1017.
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of its major reform promises of the 19 76 election. It failed 
completely on profit-sharing and land use legislation, and 
the need to compromise on parity co-determination was so 
extensive that SPD trade unionists were taunted by the left 
wing of the CDU for succumbing to trade union and party 
discipline and voting for a co-determination act that was 
unacceptable to even the small CDU trade union faction.
Co-determination and the Constitutional 
Structure of West Germany
A comment about chances for co-determination in 
British enterprises noted that if West German trade unions, 
after a twenty-five year struggle, had been unable to achieve
g
it, how much less the chances would be in Britain. Such a 
comment is misleading not only because it fails to take into 
account the complex political situation faced by the SPD, the 
West German equivalent of the British Labor Party, but be­
cause it also fails to take into account the profound 
differences in the constitutional framework of these two 
political systems. While in Britain, parliamentary supremacy 
would permit Parliament to enact whatever sort of co-deter- 
mination legislation would be politically feasible, that is, 
by a clear labor party majority and Labor-Trades Union
^Cary L. Cooper, "Employee Participation and Improv­
ing the Quality of Working Life," Derek Torrington, ed. 
Comparative Industrial Relations in Europe (London: Associated 
Business Programs Ltd., 1978), pp. 74-76.
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Congress (TUC) agreement of the nature of such legislation, 
comparable legislation would, and indeed does, face a number 
of serious constitutional obstacles in West Germany.
These constitutional obstacles are of two types: 
procedural and substantive. The existence of a Federal 
Constitutional Court and the availability of judicial review 
make it possible for opponents and critics of certain aspects 
of co-determination to raise constitutional issues in the 
appropriate federal institution; one might add that state 
(Land) governments controlled by anti-co-determination forces 
could also raise constitutional issues arising from the 
federal nature of the distribution of power in West Germany.
The impetus for substantive constitutional issues 
against full-parity co-determination was based on two argu­
ments: that full-parity co-determination would interfere
with the protection of private property, contained in para-
7
graph fourteen of the Basic Law; and that the presence of 
an equal number of employee and shareholder representatives 
on the supervisory board would not only alter the nature of 
collective bargaining between capital and labor as equal 
partners, but it would also interfere with labor*s rights of 
free association, contained in paragraph nine, section three,
7
Basic Law, Article 14: (1) ’’Property and the right
of inheritance are guaranteed. Their content and limits 
shall be determined by the laws."
o
of the Basic Law. Considering the fact that the freedom-of- 
association provision was meant to protect bona fide trade 
unions against company unions, it seems more than a little 
peculiar that present day opponents of co-determination now 
express such tender concern for the independence of trade 
unions, which might be threatened if their members sat on 
company supervisory boards. This mentioning of issues of 
constitutionality involving co-determination is to highlight 
still another structural element in the West German situation 
that has or might have an impact on the political nature of 
co-determination,
West German Trade Unions; .Co-determination 
and Collective Bargaining 
Though West German trade unions are no longer 
elements of a social movement that advocates workers with a 
total socialist environment from which much of the bourgeois 
world and culture are excluded, they are still central in­
stitutions of working class loyalty and identity. Their 
relationship with the SPD, especially when the party is in 
power, is not always an easy one, but discipline on the part 
of trade unions in Bonn remains strong— in no small degree 
because trade unions claim their share of seats in the
Q
Basic Law, Article 10: (3) "The right to form
associations to safeguard and improve working and economic 
conditions is guaranteed to everyone and to all trades, oc­
cupations and professions."
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Bundestag and federal cabinet. It is this strength and 
discipline that are bulwarks of the effectiveness of collect­
ive bargaining as the principal instrument for making and 
enforcing employee demands.
Given the corporatist quality of social organization
in West Germany, there is general acceptance of collective
bargaining as a formal and legitimate decision-making process
9m  West German corporatism. Whatever is done through works 
councils or through employee representation on the supervisory 
boards is always done within the confines of collective bar­
gaining between labor and capital, a process in which 
government often intervenes indirectly, with the nature of 
the intervention depending, obviously, on who controls the 
federal political machinery. But such intervention is 
generally considered illegitimate, because legitimacy of 
collective bargaining, strikes, and other methods of re­
solving employer-employee conflict, are fully accepted not 
only in the private but the public sector as well.
Though collective bargaining has been concerned with 
the by now traditional elements of industrial relations, 
some of the progressive unions, the metal workers among them 
(a union which includes all automobile workers in the FRG), 
have moved on to the issues of quality of the workplace, with
9
Thomas Kennedy, European Labor Relations, pp. 17 8-
181.
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notable successes on this front.
Evidence of the strength of trade union discipline 
and effectiveness, as well as for trade union responsibility, 
can be seen in West Germany’s leading other industrialized 
countries in low incidence of strikes, moderation in wage 
increases, higher worker productivity, etc. But the unions 
are intent on extending their involvement into economic 
decision-making by pressing for formal trade union partici­
pation in the institutionalization of industrial democracy.
It is this increased involvement that has generated 
a heated, sometimes vicious debate over the possibility of 
realizing the "trade union state" that classical liberals 
and conservatives see just over the proverbial "horizon."
The strong evidence that West German employees in crisis 
conditions turn to conservative, if not right-radical, 
parties, left-radical trade union bureaucrats might soon 
find themselves as so many generals without the necessary 
privates to do battle. The trade-union-state debate testi­
fies to the significance of trade unions, their collective 
bargaining, general social policy concerns, and the manner in 
which the issues of co-determination fits into the general
r
framework of the trade unions as one of the major corporative 
pillars of the West German regime.
■^Z. Almanasreh, "Institutional Forms of Worker 
Participation in the Federal German Republic," p. 97.
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There is one other aspect of trade union involvement 
in industrial democracy that deserves some consideration. 
Given trade union power in the general area of industrial 
relations, their influence over the existing works council 
machinery, the possibility of future profit sharing schemes 
in which trade unions would administer employees1 shares, 
and central government investment control by a government in 
which trade unions play a major role, critics may be justi­
fied in raising the issue of dominant representation. If, 
under such conditions, employees (trade unions) have numeric­
al parity on supervisory boards, the total impact of trade 
union power would overbear the voice and influence of share­
holders and managers. ^  However, realization of such a 
possibility might be cut short by CDU success in a forth­
coming election— not at all an unlikely possibility— in 19 84 
given the narrow margin of the SPD-FPD victory in 19 80.
West German Co-determination and 
the European Community 
Presently and in the immediate future, establishing 
systems of co-determination within the various nations of 
Western Europe will be determined chiefly by domestic factors. 
Currently there exists profound variations in the approaches 
to industrial democracy in Western Europe. But one ought to
"^Gerard Braunthal, The Federation of Germany Indus- 
try in Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1965), pp. 270-275.
56
keep in mind that developments are under way on the supra­
national level that will eventually create constraints on 
national decision-making in that context.
Though a common European company law is still far
from being realized, once such harmonization has been
achieved, the manner in which employees will be able to
participate in company decision-making will then have to be
contoured into a supranational instrument. It might be that
demands for co-determination that cannot be obtained in a
purely national context could be secured under the pressure
of a common front of transnational trade unions and a common
12European company law.
Co-determination as a National Symbol
The traditional trade union perception of co-deter­
mination in West Germany has always been that of a means to 
an end. Generally speaking, trade unions have taken an 
instrumental, utilitarian view of such measures. Their per­
ception has also eschewed a view of co-determination as a 
way of transforming the existing social order. Rather, it 
has lead to a more equal relationship between labor and
12See George Sanderson, gen. ed., Industrial Democracy 
Today: A New Role for Labor (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1979),
Recent Developments in the International Work Environment, by 
Eric Trist, pp. 56-62; Thomas Kennedy, European Labor Rela­
tions , pp. 377-394; Roger Harrison, Workers1 Participation in 
Western Europe, pp. 7-10; Derek Torrington, ed., Comparative 
Industrial Relations in Europe, The Future of Industrial 
Relations in Europe, by Jack A. Peel, pp. 253-269.
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capital and not to the elimination of the capitalist order as 
it is known. These have been the standard positions of the 
DGB and it is difficult to interpret such pronouncements as 
any sort of revolutionary intentions.
Taking into account the generally moderate ideology 
of most of the DGB1s constituent unions and of the majority 
of the SPD, and considering also the development of West 
Germany's economy as one of the healthier of the capitalist 
economies, albeit functioning in a corporative framework of 
legally defined parameters of operation, one is tempted to 
inquire what the co-determination debate has been all about. 
Has co-determination become a historic demand of the labor 
movement that no one has the courage to remove from its 
place of honor? Has co-determination variations, either in 
the coal and steel version or its works council version 
really improved the life of the work force? Has it really 
served to constrain the capitalistic, autocratic managers 
from their preferred alternatives in industrial relations 
and economic policy?
In short, have the voices of the working man and his 
representatives received a genuine hearing, and have employee 
representatives on the supervisory boards and the elaborate 
machinery of works councils altered economic policy and 
industrial relations in the Federal Republic of Germany? 
Unless unambiguous answers can be given to these questions—  
a doubtful possibility--the record of the struggle over
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co-determination, at least in the years since 1969, has many 
of the earmarks of a futile exercise in symbolic representa­
tion. To say so is not to denigrate the importance or 
significance of symbols in the political process. At the 
same time, if co-determination has only become a symbol, 
might not the trade unions and the SPD have diverted their 
energies in another direction, if they wanted to have a 
greater say in West German social policy and economic 
decision-making?
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CHAPTER V
PERIPHERAL ISSUES OF INDUSTRIAL 
DEMOCRACY IN WEST GERMANY 
The assumption of a homogenous, mono-cultural work 
force is common to most writers on employee participation, 
self-management, and industrial democracy. Yet the indus­
trial work forces of the capitalist western world are 
increasingly heterogeneous, not only in terms of race and 
ethnicity, but also in terms of age, sex, religion, occupa­
tion, education, technology, and industry. The intent of 
this chapter is to initiate discussion and raise questions 
concerning some of the peripheral, yet complex issues which 
need to be studied if one is to understand the inter­
relationship between a heterogeneous work force and industrial 
democracy in West Germany. West German experience will be 
primarily drawn upon but the issues raised are relevant to 
other advanced industrial nations.
Among the most neglected people in terms of develop­
ment and participation in industrial democracy are the 
migrant and immigrant workers. These people have been 
treated with little consideration by the governments, em­
ployers, and the many trade unions in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. The traditional methods developed to protect
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industrial employees against accidents, disease, and exploi­
tation are usually inadequate, inappropriate, or simply not 
applied to foreign workers. Ideas, policies, and proposals 
for industrial democracy developed by scholars, governments, 
managers, and trade unions tend to ignore the foreign work­
ers, or assume they will become absorbed or assimilated, or 
at best they will be given token formal recognition without 
making provisions for the special difficulties they confront 
in being involved in any form of industrial democracy.
What then are some of the key issues which need to 
be examined in relation to migrant and immigrant workers and 
industrial democracy? Although West Germany probably repre­
sents a moderate case in terms of diversity of national, 
linguistic, and cultural backgrounds in its industrial work 
force, the issues raised are likely to be relevant to other 
countries with large migrant work forces.
However, even moderate diversity in West Germany*s 
industrial work force makes industrial democracy a very 
complex issue in many plants, enterprises, and industries. 
For example, in one plant in Dortmund, in a work force of 
around 430 employees, there are members of thirty-nine 
national groups other than German.'*' One large conglomerate 
at the end of 19 76 had sixty-nine national groupings in its 
work force. The percentage of migrants and the national mix
^"Kennedy, European Labor Relations, pp. 228-229.
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varies considerably between the different production units of
industry. The work force in the largest plant in the basic
steel industry comprises nearly seventy various countries of
origin. The ethnic diversity is even more involved. For
instance, Yugoslavs in West Germany come from such diverse
cultural and often mutually hostile groups as Croats, Serbs,
Macedonians, and even Albanian (from the Yugoslavian republics
2of Montenegro and Macedonia).
If foreign workers are to be able to participate
fully in industrial democracy, then they must develop
appropriate written and verbal skills in the German language.
Reliance on interpreters may do more to increase the power
and influence of interpreters than the power and influence
of foreign workers. Sweden is the only nation of Western
Europe where the law requires an employer to provide newly
arrived foreign workers with opportunities to learn the local
language in their first year of employment. However, there
seems to be some question as to how many employers in Sweden
3are fulfilling this particular legal requirement. Else­
where, employer language training for foreign workers tends 
to be inadequate and narrowly related to technicalities of 
of job requirements and not to developing fluency for the
2Demetrios G. Papademetnou, "European Labor Migra­
tion: Consequences for the Countries of Ttforker Oriqin,"
International Studies Quarterly 22 (September 1978), 377-409.
3Jenkins, Job Power, pp. 258-273.
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levels of understanding of issues involved in industrial 
democracy. Also, many adult foreign workers have little in­
centive to learn the language, since they have little contact
4
with people outside their linguistic and cultural groups.
Mere fluency in the language is not in itself suffi­
cient to allow people to participate in discussions which 
require an ability to understand and evaluate ideas, concepts, 
and processes, particularly when these cannot be related to 
foreign workers1 education or experience. As an example, 
foreign workers who have migrated to West Germany from 
southern or eastern Europe cannot be expected to understand 
the complex nature and procedures of the long-established 
West German industrial institution of co-determination.
Additionally, many of these foreign workers come from 
authoritarian cultures where they have been educated with 
values and expectations which discourage participation in 
democratic processes, and even penalize individuals who 
suggest or espouse them. It is hardly a firm basis for the 
development of industrial democracy, A further problem is 
that many foreign workers are unaware of, or confused over, 
just what are their democratic and industrial rights. Some 
foreign workers do not realize that they have the right to 
vote in union elections even though not a citizen in the
4
Anthony Trawick Bouscaren, European Economic Com­
munity Migrations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969),
passim.
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nation of employment.
In a multi-ethnic work force certain individuals may 
gain power and influence because they function as links be­
tween management and particular ethnic employee groups. As 
an example, a pay clerk may be seen by many foreign workers 
as powerful and influential because he is responsible for 
giving them their paychecks and therefore must be respected. 
It is common practice for some companies to employ multi­
lingual people in this position and to use them also as 
interpreters and interviewers, thus increasing their power 
to influence both management and foreign workers. Under any 
system of industrial democracy such people could control 
many votes.
Another important societal group which tends to be 
relegated to the periphery by writers and decision-makers 
on industrial democracy in West Germany is that of women in 
general, and married women in particular. The members of 
this group have greatly increased their numbers in the work 
force of West Germany in recent years. In West Germany the 
participation rate of married women in the work force has 
doubled in the last thirty years to nearly forty percent.
Yet their participation in union decision-making processes 
and senior management boards is almost negligible. The 
problem is even more serious for foreign married women whose 
participation in the work force is even higher than that of
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5West German born married women.
The participation of women in the processes of in­
dustrial democracy is severely restricted by their socializa­
tion and the fact that they often carry the onus of two 
full-time occupations: one as an employee and one as a
housewife and mother. Any attempts to improve the position 
of women in the processes of industrial democracy must there­
fore acknowledge the considerable diversity in the socializa­
tion, cultures, and domestic roles of women in a multi-ethnic
g
and multi-racial work force.
The majority of migrant and immigrant women have 
little or no understanding of industrial processes and the 
wider economic, social, and political systems of an industrial 
community. They often carry out the dirtiest and most menial 
tasks, yet they fear the loss of even these jobs. Their 
sense of isolation and powerlessness is compounded daily, 
with little hope for any change in the situation.
Concepts of industrial democracy normally assume that 
the people understand and agree with the processes of democ­
racy and are free and willing to express opinions and assume 
some responsibility for decision-making. Such assumptions 
are often contrary to the values and customs of many foreign
5
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, gen. ed., The Civic 
Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1980),
Changing German Political Culture by David P. Conradt, p. 255.
^Jenny Dorling, "Women and Work," in Comparative In- 
dustrial Relations in Europe, ed. Derek Torrington, pp. 
194-212.
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households. For example, Turkish women who are culturally- 
conditioned not to speak up, and certainly not to converse 
with males other than their husbands, would face enormous 
problems of role conflict if they were allowed to participate 
in industrial democracy.
The insensitivity of some people to role conflict may 
be exemplified by a female personnel officer (herself a 
foreign worker) who admonishes Turkish men for their treatment 
of their wives, and admonishes the wives for accepting their 
culturally conditioned role. Admonition from a person in 
such a position of perceived power adds considerably to a
foreign worker's fears and anguish and probably reduces their
. . . . 7participation m  any decision-making processes.
A crucial aspect of the current world recession, 
particularly in West Germany, is that powerful and privileged 
groups openly assert their rights to maintain their standard 
of living. These groups include secure public servants and 
people in highly protected businesses and industries. The 
costs of the current recession and consequent structural ad­
justments in the economy are therefore inequitably distributed, 
the burden falling largely on the increasing number of un­
employed.
Will industrial democracy further disadvantage the 
unemployed by excluding them from access to important
7
Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy m  Germany,
p. 67.
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decisions, particularly those relating to employment? Will 
industrial democracy further help the existing work force to 
protect themselves through employment security agreements or 
tenured appointments, to the detriment of those trying to 
enter the work force? It is especially important to the in­
creasing number of youth who cannot gain access to employment. 
However, those youths lucky enough to have jobs are only in­
directly represented on the works councils of their companies
8by a youth delegation.
Industrial democracy and employee participation 
should not be limited to the mainstream of the industrial 
work force. While the above-mentioned groups are only a 
minority of the work force, it is in the best interest of 
industrial harmony for all workers to participate equally 
and equitably, The heterogenity of the West Germany indus­
trial work force and its parent society has been beneficial 
to industrial unity. But unity is only as cohesive as the 
components desire it to be. Chapter Six, then, will serve 
as a conclusion and as an evaluation. A conclusion, in the 
sense of summarizing the significance and relevance of co­
determination in West Germany, and for the rest of the 
Western world. An evaluation, in that it undertakes a 
critical examination of the thesis for its affirmability or 
its dismissal.
o
ILO, Works Constitution Act, 19 72, part 3, division 
1, sections 60-71, pp. 134-139,
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CHAPTER VI
CO-DETERMINATION AND PARTICIPATION: THE
THESIS AFFIRMED— OR IS IT?
Answers to three questions have been sought: what
has been the West German record in achieving co-determination 
in industrial decision-making? Why have particular versions 
of co-determination been adopted in the Federal Republic of 
Germany? And finally, what difference has it all made in 
the structure and functioning of the West German polity and 
in the nature of political participation in particular? 
Answers to the first two of these questions have taken up 
the bulk of the thesis; some consideration of the third query 
will follow. However, before turning to this task, it is 
necessary to summarize briefly what has been said with regard 
to the first two.
Various forms of co-determination in effect in the 
Federal Republic of Germany range from no co-determination 
in very small establishments to the 19 76 version of balanced, 
but not parity, co-determination in large corporations em­
ploying more than two thousand employees. There are three 
types of co-determination in which employee representatives 
sit on the supervisory boards, in equal numbers in the newly 
adopted law and in the Montan version of 1951, and in less
68
than equal numbers in the Works Constitution Act version of 
1952. Thus employee representatives are either clearly out­
numbered, or where they are equal in number of shareholder's 
representatives, the latter effectively can override the 
voice of the employees.
In the public service and in the 1952 works council 
version employees are limited to representation on the per­
sonnel boards and the works councils, respectively, though 
one must not minimize the significance of this representative 
device for inserting the employees' (and their unions') 
voice into industrial decision-making, covering working con­
ditions and the nature of work and of the workplace in the 
widest sense.^ There is also a strong record of employee 
consultation by management on a broad range of issues, as 
well as a strong sense of worker solidarity behind the works 
councils.
The reasons why a complex social relations pattern 
like co-determination takes a particular form in a given 
national society are always multifarious and most difficult 
to disentangle, An attempt has been made to specify two 
sets of contextual conditions. Thus, historical forces 
reaching back one hundred years and more, plus contemporary 
economic and political structural elements have combined to
^"Richard J. Willey, Democracy in the West German 
Trade Unions: A Reappraisal of the Iron Law (Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 4-13.
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give West German co-determination its particular quality.
The specific form of co-determination, which has 
focused on having employee representatives sit on company 
boards, has been shaped by the German labor movement's 
historic preference for evolutionary over revolutionary 
methods of social change and by strong bureaucratic tenden­
cies that have reinforced its evolutionary preferences. 
Concurrently, the strength of the Works Council Movement in 
post-1918 Germany made this form of employee representation
an important weapon in the arsenal of the German labor move-
2 . ment. Yet even here the evolutionary and bureaucratizing
tendencies of the movement quickly stripped the Works Council
Movement of its broader political aims and of its radical
. . . . 3political ambitions.
The manner in which co-determination evolved after 
19 49 has been strongly influenced by the sort of structural 
variables analyzed earlier. The first three of these—  
collective bargaining, pluralistic corporatism, and the 
political dynamics of West Germany— clearly have had a deci­
sive influence on the manner in which co-determination has 
developed and functioned in the Federal Republic of Germany.
2H.A. Clegg, A New Approach to Industrial Democracy, 
pp. 3-17; Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology
of Participation (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), pp. 139-
167.
3Lewis J. Edmger, Politics m  Germany: Attitudes
and Processes (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), pp.
226-227.
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The acceptance of collective bargaining as a legitimate form 
of industrial relations strongly supplements the representa­
tion of employees on the boards and in the works councils, 
thus adding to West Germany’s socio-economic corporative 
structuring. In the context of the three structural elements, 
co-determination may be seen as one of several weapons at the 
disposal of the labor movement to make demands on behalf of 
its members.
The fourth factor, West German political dynamics, 
serves more to indicate the parameters— or weaknesses— of 
the West German labor movement than its strengths. The in­
ability of the SPD and the trade unions to muster a clear 
majority in the Bundestag for their programs is clearly a 
limiting factor, especially as long as these twin organiza­
tional giants remain committed to democratic politics and to
4
the ballot box. The obstacles represented by the West German 
basic law would become insignificant in the face of a deter­
mined majority thrust. But here, too, the SPD and the trade 
unions might be confronted with internal dissension, should 
they try to use their majoritarian strength to override in 
an undemocratic manner minority views voiced on the national 
level or those opposition views that draw their power from 
the operation of the federal system. How much direct impact
4John D. May, "Democracy, Organization, Michels,"
The American Political Science Review 59 (June, 1965), pp. 
417-429.
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the developments on the supra-national level— in the European 
community and beyond--have on the shape of co-determination in 
West Germany is relatively easy to assess: very little, at
least for the short term. But even in the long term the 
problems of putting the DGB under the same roof with France *s 
Confederation General du Travail (CGT) and Italy's Confeder- 
azione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) rather boggle the 
imagination.
Can it be said, then, with any degree of confidence 
that West German co-determination has been a significant 
instrument in the hands of West German labor in its effort to 
transform the country’s economy and political relations in 
conformity with its goals? Certainly one will never be able 
to say how different economic and political relations, de­
fined broadly, would have been if the labor movement had 
concentrated solely on collective bargaining in the economic 
realm and welfare legislation in the political arena.
What is suggested here is the German (or since 1949 
the West German) version of industrial democracy clearly 
bears the stamp of the peculiar national experience of that 
particular labor movement. But the achievements on the path 
to industrial democracy so far are more nearly system main­
taining rather than system transforming in nature. This has 
been so not only, or perhaps not even chiefly, because of 
the political and economic constraints imposed on the labor 
movement, but because the movement— at least since 1949— has
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moved along almost entirely within a moderate, evolutionary
ambience. What has been achieved, though it is quite far
removed from full-parity co-determination, does not do as
much violence to the labor movement's realistic goals as the
spokesmen for that movement would declare. Simultaneously—
and without meaning to contradict what has just been said--
even if full-parity co-determination had been achieved, it
would not have been the occasion for a radical transformation
of West German society, economy or politics, even though the
DGB is clearly on record with its determination to continue
5its push for full parity.
Thomas Mann constructed a conversation between Con­
sul Buddenbrook and his employees during the revolutionary 
days of the 1848 republic. Sensing the political dissatis­
faction of his employees he asks them: "What do you want?
Tell me." To which one of them replies: "Well, Consul
Buddenbrook, all I can say is that we want a republic." "But 
we already have a republic, you stupid man," Buddenbrook 
replies with some exasperation. "Well, Consul Buddenbrook," 
the employee's response comes, "in that case we want another
g
one." A sizable segment of party and trade unions must 
surely feel that very same way about the 19 76 co-determination
5Z. Almanasreh, "Institutional Forms of Worker 
Participation in the FRG," pp. 90-94.
c
Thomas Mann, Buddenbrooks, trans. H.T. Lowe-Porter 
(New York: A.A. Kopf, 1964).
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law: if that is co-determination then we simply have to have
another one. But given the West German society1s record with 
republics in 1848 and later, one would no more be justified 
in expecting radical results in the realm of economic democ­
racy than in that of political democracy. Most observers 
agree that, with the adoption and the coming into force of 
the 1976 Co-determination Law, the issue of industrial democ­
racy has been, for all practical purposes, removed from a top
. . 7position on the FRG1s political agenda. But it says less
about the intrinsic significance of West Germany's methods 
for insuring industrial democracy than about the conservative 
nature of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Thus it would seem that the prospects for full-parity 
employee participation in West Germany are not very bright.
Any further efforts to limit the power of the managers/share­
holders will surely be resisted strongly. Yet the West German 
labor movement has achieved a considerable degree of influence 
over economic decision-making through collective bargaining 
and works councils, as well as through the working of the 
corporatist machinery.
Is this experience relevant to other post-industrial 
societies? Three very tentative suggestions might be ad­
vanced. First, formulas for industrial democracy, like those
7
F.E. Emery, "The Next Thirty Years: Concepts,
Methods and Anticipation," Human Relations 20 (August, 1967), 
199-235.
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for political democracy, are just that: instrumentalities
that must be made to work in a complex environment and whose 
success depends chiefly on the manner in which these instru­
mentalities fit into the larger political context. Second, 
socio-economic corporatism along the lines of the West German 
version is likely to be a conservative influence; that is to 
say, it will serve to maintain the social and political status 
quo, even though it might permit a large degree of technologic­
al innovation. These systems will look very modern in the 
technological sense but will tend to maintain a very trad­
itional socio-political set of institutional arrangements.
Third, in such a corporatist system the technocrats
will more likely remain confined to their realm of expertise
and will not reach out for power in other realms, as might be
the case in non-corporatist systems. Such a hypothesis runs
contrary to much of what is being said about the growing power
of technocrats--military or civilian— in various parts of the
world. It would seem that in socio-economic corporatism
wedded to a pluralistic political arrangement, as is the case
in West Germany, the technocrats will confine themselves to
their realm of expertise, for the corporative structure vests
8them with considerable influence in such a role.
Because the Federal Republic of Germany might be 
what psychologists call a strong deviant case, it might be
g
David Jenkins, Job Power, p. 300.
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difficult to construct a sound framework for comparative 
analysis with other industrializing or post-industrial 
nations. However, there is little that deserves more atten­
tion than gaining an understanding of the inter-action 
between demands for industrial democracy and the increasing 
tendencies toward socio-economic corporatism in such nations. 
It is this concern that has justified the present analysis 
and that ought to encourage further exploration elsewhere, 
in the form of empirical studies and comparative analysis.
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